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 State legislatures have long sought to restrict the export
of water from sources located within the state for use
elsewhere.  Such efforts trace back at least as far as 1905,
when the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute
prohibiting the export of water to any other state.  Three
years later, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (209 U.S. 349
[1908])  that the New Jersey embargo statute did not
violate any provision of the United States Constitution. In
the decades that followed, many state legislatures
—especially those in arid western states—enacted statutes
prohibiting or significantly restricting the interstate
export of water.  It was generally assumed, in view of the
Hudson County case, that these statutes were
constitutionally valid.
  
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court shattered that
long-standing assumption in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas (458 U.S. 941).  The Court ruled that a
Nebraska statute regulating interstate water export was
subject to scrutiny under the negative commerce clause of
the Constitution and that one provision of the statute was
constitutionally impermissible and thus invalid.  This
paper focuses on what limits the dormant commerce
clause, as interpreted in Sporhase and later cases,
imposes on states wishing to regulate interstate water
export.
NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE BASICS
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution
states that “Congress shall have . . . Power . . . to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”  This clause
obviously grants Congress power to enact laws regulating
interstate commerce.  But the United States Supreme
Court has found in the clause more than an affirmative
grant of regulatory power to Congress. The Court has also
found implicit in the clause the assertion of a “national
interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences which seriously impede it.”  (Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 [1945].)  Moreover,
the Court has established that this implicitly asserted
national interest operates to prohibit states from enacting
laws that interfere too much with the free flow of
interstate commerce.  This latter aspect of the commerce
clause, as distinguished from the affirmative grant of
power to Congress, is often called the negative commerce
clause since it negates power states would otherwise have
to regulate interstate commerce.  It is also called the
dormant commerce clause since it limits state power to
regulate interstate commerce even if Congress has not
affirmatively enacted any laws regarding the particular
kind of interstate commerce at issue.
The critical question that arises under the negative
commerce clause is how much state interference with the
free flow of commerce between states is too much.  The
Supreme Court has used different approaches over the
years in dealing with that question.  Generally, however,
the Court in its modern cases has weighed the national
interest in the free flow of interstate commerce against
whatever interest a state might advance to justify the
interference.  The Court proceeds somewhat differently
with the weighing process, depending on whether the
state regulation being scrutinized discriminates against
interstate commerce.  A state regulation might be
discriminatory on its face, or it might be facially
evenhanded but be found to be discriminatory in its
purpose or its practical effect.  Nondiscriminatory state
regulations are judged by a test articulated as follows in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (397 U.S. 137 [1970]):
 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. . . . And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Discriminatory state regulations are treated less
deferentially.  The Court gives them “strictest scrutiny”
(Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 [1979])
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regarding (1) whether the regulation serves a legitimate
state objective and (2) whether that objective could be




The appellants in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas
jointly owned two contiguous parcels of land, one in
Nebraska and the other in Colorado.  They had a well on
the Nebraska parcel from which they pumped water to
irrigate both parcels.  A Nebraska statute required a
permit to transport groundwater taken from a well in that
state for use in an adjoining state.  The statute did not
allow an export permit to issue unless (a) the
groundwater withdrawal was reasonable, (b) it was not
contrary to the conservation of groundwater, (c) it was
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, and (d)
the state of export granted reciprocal rights to withdraw
groundwater from a well within its borders for use in
Nebraska.  The appellants had not obtained a permit, and
it was clear they could not get one because Colorado did
not grant reciprocal rights.  When the State of Nebraska
sued to enjoin the appellants from transporting water to
their Colorado parcel for lack of a permit, they responded
by asserting that the statute was invalid under the
negative commerce clause.
Applicability of the Commerce Clause to Water 
When the Supreme Court upheld New Jersey’s water
embargo statute in 1908, it ruled that the negative
commerce clause did not even apply to the state’s
regulation of water export.  The Court reasoned that the
state owned unused waters within its borders in trust for
its people and, as the initial owner, could limit what
rights private parties were allowed to acquire from the
state in those waters.  Moreover, said the Court, by
limiting private parties to using water only within the
state, New Jersey prevented state waters from becoming
articles of commerce.  Since the waters were not articles
of commerce, state regulation of the waters was not
subject to the negative commerce clause. 
 
In 1979, the Court rejected similar reasoning regarding
alleged state ownership of wild fish and game. The Court
ruled that Oklahoma’s asserted state ownership of
uncaptured minnows within state borders did not exempt
a state statute banning the interstate export of  minnows
from scrutiny under the negative commerce clause.
(Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322.)  This set the stage
for the Court in Sporhase to overrule its 1908 Hudson
County precedent regarding water.  The Court said in
Sporhase that Nebraska’s asserted state ownership of
unused groundwater within its borders was merely a legal
fiction—a fiction expressing in shorthand the valid point
that the state must have power to regulate the resource
but not giving the state power to regulate it free of the
limits of the negative commerce clause. 
 
The groundwater source in Sporhase was the Ogallala
aquifer, which underlies six states.  Most commentators
on Sporhase have concluded, however, that the negative
commerce clause generally would apply also to state
regulation of interstate export from a water source located
wholly within the regulating state.  (Grant 1991: §
48.03(a)(1)).  Perhaps the most persuasive reason for this
broad reading of Sporhase is that the Court’s opinion
seemed to equate the reach of the negative commerce
clause with the reach of the affirmative aspect of the
commerce clause, and the affirmative aspect would enable
federal regulation of all but the most minor of intrastate
water sources.  (See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 [1979]).
Effect of the Negative Commerce Clause on Water Export
Regulation 
In applying the negative commerce clause to the
Nebraska statute, the Supreme Court divided the statute
into two parts.  The Court found that the first part of the
statute—stating the three requirements that the
groundwater withdrawal must be (a) reasonable, (b) not
contrary to groundwater conservation, and (c) not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare—was
evenhanded.  This part did not discriminate against
interstate commerce because Nebraska imposed similar
limits on the withdrawal of groundwater for use within
the state.  The Court found further that the statute
effectuated the legitimate state interest of conserving
diminishing sources of groundwater.  The first part of the
statute thus came within the Pike formula.
As noted above, the Pike formula states that an
evenhanded state regulation that pursues a legitimate
local objective but incidentally interferes with the flow of
interstate commerce will be upheld unless the burden
imposed  on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive”
relative to the local benefits.  The Pike formula adds that
the nature of the local interest served by the state
regulation affects how much burden on interstate
commerce will be tolerated before it becomes excessive.
In Sporhase, the Court expanded on these points as they
pertain to water.  It announced that it was “reluctant to
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condemn as unreasonable measures taken by a State to
conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital
resource in times of severe shortage.” It said that this
reluctance stemmed from a confluence of four realties,
which will be examined below.  The Court concluded that
the first part of the Nebraska statute did not excessively
burden interstate commerce in light of the legitimate
conservation objective.
The second part of the Nebraska statute—the reciprocity
provision—fared differently.  The Court found that
because Colorado did not reciprocate, Nebraska’s
reciprocity requirement was an explicit barrier to
interstate commerce in water.  Moreover, the Court
treated the reciprocity requirement as facially
discriminatory, so that it was subject to strict scrutiny of
whether it served a legitimate state objective and whether
that objective could be accomplished as well by some less
discriminatory approach.  The reciprocity requirement
did not survive this scrutiny.  The Court concluded that
Nebraska failed to show a close fit between the
requirement and the asserted objective of conserving
diminishing sources of groundwater.  This was because
the reciprocity requirement would prevent export to
Colorado even if the water supply at a well in Nebraska
was abundant and the most beneficial use of the water
would be in Colorado.  In other words, the reciprocity
requirement was overbroad as a means of pursuing the
asserted conservation objective.
STATE REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES UNDER
SPORHASE
The Sporhase decision leaves two basic approaches for a
state that wants to regulate the interstate export of water.
One is for the state to enact a discriminatory statute and
try to defend it against strict judicial scrutiny.  Some
people have found encouragement for use of this
approach from two statements in the Sporhase opinion.
First, the  Court said that a reciprocity provision might be
valid if a state could show that overall it has a water
shortage, that water could feasibly be transported from its
areas of abundance to areas of shortage, and that the
import of water from adjoining states would roughly
compensate for any export to those states.  Second, the
Court said that a demonstrably arid state conceivably
might even be able to show a close fit between the
purpose of conserving and preserving water and a total
ban on export.
But the discriminatory approach is risky.  The Court's
statement in Sporhase concerning when a reciprocity
provision might be valid involved an unusual fact
situation, and the Court’s suggestion that a total ban on
water export might conceivably be the only means
available to achieve a legitimate conservation purpose
was unexplained and no more than tentative.
The second basic approach under Sporhase is for the state
to enact a nondiscriminatory statute in an effort to avoid
strict scrutiny and qualify for the general Pike test.
Although this approach is less risky than the first one, it
still can be unclear in a particular case whether a court
would decide that the state burden on commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the local benefits. The process of
weighing the national interest in the free flow of
interstate commerce against whatever legitimate local
interest a state asserts for a challenged regulation is more
than a little subjective.  A critic of the process, one who
happens to sit on the Supreme Court, has written: “[T]he
scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests
on both sides are incommensurate.  It is . . . like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock
is heavy.”  ( Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises, Inc. 486 U.S. 888, 897 [1988] (Scalia, J.,
concurring opinion)).  
It might seem that evenhanded state water export
regulation would fare well under the negative commerce
clause given the Supreme Court’s stated reluctance in
Sporhase to condemn as unreasonable measures taken by
a state to conserve and preserve for its own citizens vital
water resources in times of severe shortage.  This
statement by the Court is less reassuring, however, when
one examines the four realities that the Court said gave
rise to its reluctance and notes some questions that the
Court’s discussion of the realities did not address.  
The first reality is that a state's power to regulate water
use during shortages to protect the health of its citizens,
and not simply the health of its economy, is at the core of
its police power.  But what if the state's water shortage is
not severe enough to threaten the health of its citizens?
The second reality is that interstate water compacts and
the Court’s equitable apportionment decrees between
states have fostered the expectation that under "certain
circumstances," a state can restrict water within its
borders.  Exactly what are those circumstances?  The
third reality, said the Court, is that although Nebraska's
claimed ownership of unused water did not prevent the
water from being an article of commerce and thus subject
to the commerce clause, the state's claim of ownership
might support a "limited preference" for state citizens.
Just what is the scope of this limited preference?  Would
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it shrink if a state does not restrict intrastate commerce in
water as much as Nebraska does?  The fourth reality is
that the continued availability of groundwater in
Nebraska depended upon state conservation measures,
thus giving the water "some indicia" of a publicly
produced and owned good in which a state can favor its
citizens in time of shortage.  On this point, the Court
cited a case which ruled that South Dakota could give
state residents a preferred right to purchase cement from
a state operated cement plant.  But how significant is it
that the cement plant case was decided principally under
an exemption from the negative commerce clause that
exists when a state acts as a market participant rather
than as a market regulator? 
POST-SPORHASE LITIGATION
The City of El Paso, Texas, located just below the
southern border of New Mexico, filed with the New
Mexico State Engineer 326 applications to appropriate
almost 300,000 acre-feet of groundwater annually for
export to the city.  The city was seeking the new water
supply because it projected that within 30 years its
existing primary source of water would become too saline
for use.  The state engineer denied the permit applications
under a statute that flatly prohibited the transport of water
outside the state.  In 1983, shortly after the Sporhase
decision, El Paso challenged the statute under the
negative commerce clause in the federal district court in
New Mexico.
There was little doubt (and the court found) that the
statute was facially discriminatory.  New Mexico sought
to sustain the statute by arguing that a water embargo was
the only way it could avoid a projected  statewide water
shortage by the year 2020.  New Mexico was relying, of
course, on the statement in Sporhase that a demonstrably
arid state might be able to show a close fit between
conserving and preserving water and a total ban on
export.  The court, however, declared the statute
unconstitutional.  The court focused on the first of the
four “realities” from Sporhase, namely, the Supreme
Court’s statement that a state's power to regulate water
use during shortages to protect the health of its citizens,
and not simply the health of its economy, is at the core of
its police power.  The court inferred from this statement
that “a state may discriminate in favor of its citizens only
to the extent that water is essential to human survival,”
and that “[o]utside of fulfilling human survival needs,
water is an economic resource.”  The court was therefore
unimpressed by New Mexico's argument that it would
suffer a statewide water shortage by 2020 because that
argument was based on estimated water needs for various
economic activities, rather than on needs for public health
and safety.  (City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp;
379 [D.N.M. 1983]).
The New Mexico Legislature responded to this setback
with several new statutes, and El Paso promptly
challenged them in the same federal district court as
before.  The court struck down two of the new statutes on
the ground that they were facially discriminatory and did
not survive strict scrutiny.  (City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
597 F. Supp. 694 [D.N.M. 1984]).
A third new statute was modeled after the part of the
Nebraska statute that was upheld in Sporhase.  It
authorizes the State Engineer to issue a permit to
appropriate water for interstate export only if the
proposed use would not impair existing rights, would not
be contrary to water conservation within the state, and
would not be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare
of New Mexico citizens.  (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1).
Unlike the Nebraska model, however, the New Mexico
statute also lists six specific factors for the State Engineer
to consider in acting on export applications.  The first
four relate to water use conditions within New
Mexico—the supply, the demand, whether shortages
exist, and the feasibility of transporting water at the
proposed point of diversion to alleviate shortages in the
state.  The remaining two factors relate to water supply
and demand conditions in the state of proposed export.
The federal district court hearing the second El Paso case
rejected the city’s claim that this statute was
unconstitutional on its face.  
The court ruled that the statute was facially
nondiscriminatory because in-state water appropriations
were subject to similar requirements of not impairing
existing rights, not being contrary to water conservation,
and not being otherwise detrimental to the public welfare
of New Mexico citizens.  The court viewed the six factors
relating to water supply and demand conditions in New
Mexico and in the state of proposed export as simply
necessary considerations in applying the balancing test
prescribed by Sporhase for evenhanded regulation that
effectuates a legitimate state interest.  On that basis, the
court upheld the statute.
The court reiterated the view it expressed in the first El
Paso case that a state may not limit water export merely
to protect local economic interests.  Unlike in the first
case, however, the court in the second El Paso case called
attention to the possibility that a state might restrict water
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export based on the third reality in Sporhase.  This reality
was that a state’s public ownership of groundwater may
support a “limited preference” for its own citizens.  The
court interpreted this point in Sporhase to mean that a
state could give some preference to conserving water for
its citizens to achieve noneconomic benefits such as
promoting health, safety, recreation, aesthetics, and
environmental values.  This interpretation enabled the
court to uphold the New Mexico statute even though its
“not detrimental to the public welfare” requirement
referred only to the welfare of New Mexico citizens and
did not mention the welfare of people in the state of
proposed export.  The court reasoned that Sporhase
sometimes allows a state to restrict interstate export to
promote the noneconomic welfare of its citizens.
The second El Paso case was decided before the New
Mexico State Engineer had applied the new statute to the
city’s pending permit applications.  For that reason, the
court’s decision finding no negative commerce clause
problem related only to the validity of the statute on its
face, that is, to the  statute in the abstract rather than as
the factors listed in the statute had been applied to reach
a result in a particular fact situation.  The court cautioned
that although the statute was constitutional on its face,
that did not mean the State Engineer was free to apply the
listed factors without regard to the negative commerce
clause.  In other words, the State Engineer’s application
of the factors to particular fact situations would still be
subject to scrutiny under the negative commerce clause,
and some applications resulting in restriction of water
export might constitute an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce. 
After the second El Paso decision, the State Engineer
processed El Paso’s permit applications.  At this stage of
the proceedings, yet another New Mexico statute became
critical.  This statute provides that no municipality can
acquire and hold unused water rights in excess of its
needs for the next 40 years. (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9).
After conducting a hearing, the State Engineer found that
El Paso's available sources of water apart from the
proposed wells in New Mexico will be sufficient for its
needs until 2020, which is 40 years from the date of its
permit applications.  He thus denied all of the city’s
applications.  (In re Applications of the City of El Paso,
Texas, Nos. LRG-92 through LRG-357 and HU-12
through HU-71, State Engineer’s Findings and Order
[Dec. 23, 1987]).  
Another post-Sporhase case on the negative commerce
clause is worth noting though it did not involve state
legislation regulating water export.  Maine v. Taylor (477
U.S. 131 [1986]) concerned a Maine statute banning the
import into that state of live baitfish.  Although the
statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce
in baitfish, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it
did not violate the negative commerce clause.  The Court
accepted Maine’s argument that (1) the ban served the
legitimate local objective of protecting the state’s wild
fish population from parasites in imported baitfish and
from non-native species inadvertently included in baitfish
shipments that would threaten the state’s wild fish
population and (2) there was no less discriminatory
means available to accomplish this local objective because
there was no satisfactory way to inspect imported baitfish
shipments for parasites or commingled non-native
species.  The Court also commented: 
The Commerce Clause . . . does not elevate free
trade above all other values.  As long as a State does
not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to
“place itself in a position of economic isolation,” . . .
it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of
its natural resources.
While this statement may offer some encouragement to
state legislatures that want to enact discriminatory
restrictions on interstate water export, it should be
remembered that no state has yet been able to sustain a
discriminatory water export statute.  Counting the
reciprocity provision in the Sporhase case and the New
Mexico statutes evaluated in the El Paso cases, the box
score on facially discriminatory water export measures is
0 for 4.  
POST-SPORHASE LEGISLATION
The Nebraska/New Mexico Model
The Sporhase opinion affected western states more than
eastern states, since statutes restricting  interstate water
export were more common in the West.  Many western
states have re-examined how they regulate interstate
water export in the fifteen years since Sporhase was
decided.  As noted above, New Mexico was forced to do
this quite soon after Sporhase and settled upon using the
three requirements of the Nebraska statute upheld in
Sporhase—that the water withdrawal must be reasonable,
not contrary to conservation, and not otherwise
detrimental to the public welfare—together with some
embellishments of its own.  After the second El Paso
case, several other states enacted legislation modeled after
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the Nebraska statute as embellished by New Mexico.
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-292; IDAHO CODE §§ 42-
203A(5), -222(1), -401; MONTANA CODE ANN. § 85-2-
141(7), -311(4), -316(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3a-101
to -109).  The Sporhase statute applied only to
groundwater, but these newer statutes apply to surface
water as well.
Colorado borrowed a single requirement from the
Nebraska/New Mexico model—that the export must be
consistent with reasonable conservation of the state’s
water resources—but added a new requirement—that the
export must be consistent with interstate water allocation
compacts and Supreme Court equitable apportionment
water decrees to which Colorado is a party.  (COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-81-101(3)).  Another Colorado statute
imposes an export fee of $50 per acre-foot and directs that
the accumulated fees should be spent on water projects for
the state.  (COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-104).  The
Colorado Attorney General has opined that the export fee
violates the negative commerce clause since no similar
fee is imposed on water use within the state.  (OP. ATT’Y
GEN., AG File No. ONR 8504 066/AON [Sept. 10,
1985]).
Interestingly, Nebraska has now repealed the Sporhase
statute in its entirety, including the three requirements
that the Supreme Court upheld.  Nebraska has enacted a
new statute that, like the old one, applies only to
groundwater.  The new statute seems to be based on some
of New Mexico’s embellishments to the Sporhase statute.
It lists the following criteria for evaluating a proposed
export: whether the water will be put to a beneficial use,
the availability to the permit applicant of other water
supplies, any adverse effect the export would have upon
ability of the area from which the water will be taken to
meet its reasonable future needs, and any other factors
consistent with the state objective of maintaining an
adequate source of groundwater essential for social
stability of the state and the health, safety, and welfare of
state citizens.  (NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01).
Other Approaches
Several states do not leave individual export decisions
entirely to state water resources agencies but require
legislative approval, at least for some export proposals.
(IDAHO CODE § 42-108; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-
402(5) to -(6); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.2(2);
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 to -.870; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 46-5-20.1; WYO. STAT. § 41-3-115).  The statutes
vary widely as to which proposed exports receive
legislative scrutiny.  For example, the South Dakota
statute requires legislative approval for new
appropriations for export that exceed 10,000 acre-feet
annually but excludes those made by a named
conservancy district or made for use in the energy
industry, while Idaho requires legislative approval to
change the period or nature of use of  an existing
appropriation of more 5000 acre-feet or 50 cubic feet per
second if the change will continue for three years or
more.  The statutes requiring legislative approval also
vary regarding what criteria the legislature will apply.
For example, the Oklahoma statute lists no specific
factors for the legislature to consider while the Wyoming
statute specifies numerous factors.
Montana and New Mexico have pursued an interesting
approach to Sporhase.  Both states have sought to take
advantage of what is known as the market-participant
exemption from the negative commerce clause.  This
exemption allows a state to favor residents over
nonresidents when it acts as a market participant rather
than a market regulator.  If a state operates a cement
plant, for example, it is entitled to limit sales to its
residents in times of shortage without running afoul of
the commerce clause.  In an effort to make the state into
a market participant regarding water allocation, Montana
allows only the state to appropriate water for consumption
in excess of 4000 acre-feet per year and 5.5 cubic feet per
second, and it also allows only the state to appropriate
water in any amount from six river basins for transport
outside those basins.  Then persons wishing to use such
appropriated water must lease it from the state.  (MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-141(10), -301(2).  New Mexico has
legislation authorizing a long-term state appropriation
and leasing program.  N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-14-43 to
-44).  New Mexico does not bar private water
appropriations but allows state appropriations to exist
unexercised for up to a century.  If the state makes
significant appropriations in various regions, that might
leave no unappropriated water available for private
appropriation, while state-appropriated water would be
available for leasing.  The constitutional validity of these
Montana and New Mexico  programs is uncertain
because the few Supreme Court cases that discuss the
market-participant exemption leave important
unanswered questions.   It is unclear, for example,
whether the exemption would apply when a state grants
rights to a natural resource, like water, as contrasted with
when the state sells a product it has manufactured.  (See
Grant 1991: § 48.03(c)(5)).
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Some states have statutes restricting the right to use water
outside the watershed or river basin where the water
originates.  (E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-1502; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §
11.085.)  The regulatory focus of these statutes is
interbasin export, not interstate export.  The statutes
apply, however, to some interstate exports, namely, those
in which the water will be used not only in another basin
but in another state.
The negative commerce clause limits the power of states,
not the power of the United States Congress.  Congress
can authorize states to impose export restrictions that
would otherwise violate the negative commerce clause,
though such authorization must be unmistakably clear
before a court will recognize it.  (South-Central Timber
Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 [1984]).  Although
Congress has seldom exercised its power to authorize
export restrictions upon water, some states have managed
to obtain such congressional authorization.  For example,
the congressionally approved Yellowstone River Compact
contains a provision prohibiting interbasin export without
the consent of all the states that were parties to the
compact.  Because Congress has consented to that
provision,  it can  be validly applied to
interbasin/interstate export as well as to
interbasin/intrastate export.  (Intake Water Co. v.
Yellowstone River Compact Commission, 769 F.2d 568
[9th Cir. 1985].)  Another instance of congressional
exercise of its authorization power is found in the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986.  This Act prohibits
export of water outside the Great Lakes  basin without the
consent of all the governors of the Great Lakes states.
(42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d)).  
CONCLUSION
The Sporhase case revolutionized the law regarding state
restrictions on interstate water export by making such
restrictions subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative
commerce clause.  The two El Paso cases technically are
not binding law outside of  New Mexico, but they provide
interesting guidance on how the negative commerce
clause might affect state water export restrictions.  In
those cases, the federal district court for New Mexico
discussed implications of the first and third Sporhase
realities, namely, that a state's power to regulate water
use during shortages to protect the health of its citizens,
and not simply the health of its economy, is at the core of
its police power and that a state’s public ownership of
water may support a limited preference for its own
citizens.  The court concluded that a state could give
limited preference to its own citizens but only for
noneconomic purposes.  
Neither El Paso opinion, however, addressed the effect of
the second and fourth Sporhase realities, namely, that
interstate water compacts and Supreme Court equitable
apportionment decrees have fostered the legal expectation
that under certain circumstances a state may restrict
water to being used within its borders and that state water
conservation efforts may give water some indicia of a
publicly owned and produced good in which a state may
favor its own citizens in time of shortage.  Interstate
compacts and equitable apportionment decrees allocate
water based on economic considerations as well as
noneconomic ones.  (See Grant 1991: §§ 45.06(c) &
46.03).  Similarly, the reference to a publicly owned and
produced good relates to the market-participant
exemption from the negative commerce clause, and that
exemption allows preferences based on economic
considerations.  In view of the perhaps mixed signals
given by the four Sporhase realities, it remains to be seen
whether other courts will agree with the El Paso court
that no preference for in-state water use to achieve
economic objectives is constitutionally permissible. 
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